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E. S.GREGG
The developments in our merchant shipping industry in the last five
years are related to the following:
1. The gradual restoration of an approximate equilibrium
between the world supply of ships, which had been greatly enlarged
for war purposes, and the volume of ocean-borne commerce, which
had been diminished by the dislocation of channels of trade and the
exhaustion of productive effort in many countries;
2. The attempts to liquidate our own huge surplus of war-built
and Government-owned ships; and
3. The phenomenal growth of water shipments between the
Atlantic and Pacific Coasts by way of the Panama Canal.
Total Available Tonnage.—The world shipping industry has had to
contend with the largest surplus of tonnage in its history.The ship
tonnage of the world was 36 per cent greater in 1923 than in 1914.
TABLE. 1.—STEEL ANDIRONSTEAM AND MOTOR Si-ups (ExcLuDINGLAKE TONNAGE),
100GROSS TONS AND OVER
(Millions of gross tons as of June 30)
Country 1914 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928
Great Britain and Ireland... 18.9 19.1 18.9 19.3 19.2 19.2 19.7
British Dominion 1.4 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.4
UnitedStates 1.8 12.4 11.8 11.6 11.1 10.8 10.9
Italy 2.5 2.8 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.4 3.3
Germany 5.1 2.5 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.7
France 1.9 3.3 3.2 I3.3 3.3 3.4 3.3
Holland 1.5 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.8
Scandinavia 3.7 4.3 4.4 4.8 5.0 5.1 5.4
Japan 1.6 3.4 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.0
Other 4.1 5.3 5.2 5.4 5.7 5,5 6.1
Total 42.5 57.9 57.5 58.8 59.1 59.5 61.6
No exact data on the volume of ocean-borne trade are available, but
estimates in 1923 placed it at only about 80 to 85 per cent of prewar.
With a third more ships and a fifth less cargo, the maladjustment of
supply to demand was serious.A world-wide survey by the Department
of Commerce showed 9,128,000 gross tons of ships idle in the ports of the
309310 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
world on January 1, 1923, or 16 per cent of the world total.The remark-
able thing is that more tonnage was not out of active employment.This
surplus has gradually been absorbed into trade or has been scrapped, and
the latest figures show only 4,331,000 tons idle.Of this amount, over
half will perhaps never be used regularly.The real surplus may now be
said to be about 3 per cent, and this surplus is made up largely of types
becoming rapidly obsolete and unusable.Statistics of world trade also
indicate that the volume of ocean-borne commerce is now approximately
at the level of 1913.
TABLE 2.—IDLE STEAM SHIPPING OF PRINCIPAL MARITIME COUNTRIES
(Thousands of gross tons as of January 1)
Country 19231924'1925192619271928
Idle in home country:
United States Shipping Board 4,4113,5643,6643,5182,3362,371
Shipping Board tankers 214 163 125 134 56 41
Privately owned 703 541 417 458 457 544
Government owned other than Shipping Board 3 17 10 27 22
Total 5,3284,2714,2254,1202,8762,978
United Kingdom 1,010 909 705 613 529 539
Franca 730 450 311 134 118 80
Italy 472 427 136 140 128 276
Netherlands 330 235 65 109 3 16
Norway 53 50 25 22 37 93
Sweden 22 20 30 9 35
Greece 76 122 .24 99 106 77
Japan 99 29 25 35 48 85
Belgium 170 86 26 21 14 1
Denmark 17 13 63 20 26
Spain 520 128 60 44 35 31
Australia 106 85 166 51 71 29
Idle in foreign countries 195 83 103 279 100 65
Grand total 9,1286,8885,8915,7604,0944,331
This large surplus of ships and the failure of the volume of the ocean-
borne trade of the world to exceed prewar figures caused the profits
of many cargo shipping companies to disappear entirely and of others to
shrink almost to the vanishing point.The explanation issimple.
Charter rates for voyages, that is, when a shipper charters a vessel for
one or more specific voyages for a specified kind of cargo, were forced
below the levels prevailing before the war.The Economist (London)













The decline in these rates has been uninterrupted, except in 1926,
when the British coal strike caused an unusual demand for tramp ton-
nage.Ship operating expenses have fluctuated between 50 and 100
per cent above prewar.While it is difficult to get a weighted index of
ship operating expenses, such an index would perhaps be nearer 100
per cent above prewar than 50 per cent.The profits of most cargo
shipping companies were ground to pieces between these two millstones.
All ocean shipping has not fared so badly.Recent studies show that
approximately four-fifths of the transoceanic shipping of the world is
operated on regular routes, as contrasted with less than two-thirds before
the war.The picturesque tramp ship, roaming the seven seas for cargo,
is disappearing.
As the volume of production and trade of commodities entering into
ocean-borne commerce has increased,shipper and consignee have
demanded faster and more regular services.The tendency toward a
more level rate of general business operations has resulted in a marked
smoothing out of the seasonal movement of agricultural commodities.
It was the seasonal gluts of supplies to be moved that kept the tramp
ship moving from one route to another.In the North Atlantic to-day
practically all of the American wheat crop is carried in liners, and liners
have taken from tramp ships most of the movement of cotton out
of the Gulf.A cargo liner partly laden with miscellaneous high grade
cargo is nearly always willing to fill out with wheat, cotton, or some other
bulk commodity.Over most trade routes there is a large enough volume
of general cargo moving to justify the use of ships on regular schedules.
The result is that only unusual quantities of seasonal goods and some of the
so-called "dirty" cargo, such as coal, now call for the use of tramp ships.
Liner companies, through conference rate agreements, are able partly
to nullify the fierce competition which is normal in tramp shipping.
Conference agreements between lines serving United States ports are
when these agreements are accepted by and filed with the Ship-
Board.Our legislation recognizes the value of the stability achieved
through conferenceagreements.The liner companies cateringto
passenger traffic have usually been able to earn more on their investment
than straight cargo liner companies, and the last five years have been no312 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
exception in this respect.But in the passenger carrying trades and espe-
cially in the North Atlantic, the tendency in the last few years has been
toward larger and faster ships, a costly competitive tendency which may,
at least temporarily, reduce net earnings.
Shipbuilding.—The large growth in oversea bulk shipments of
petroleum and its products has resulted in an increase of tanker tonnage,
from 1,479,000 tons in 1914 to 5,161,000 tons in 1923 and a further increase
to 6,544,000 tons in 1928.While most tanker tonnage is owned by the
large oil companies, the independently owned tanker companies have
fared better than shipping companies in general.It can be said, however,
that ocean shipping on the average has had lean earnings since 1923.
This adverse earning situation necessarily reacted on the demand for
new ships.The tonnage of steam vessels under construction in 1923
was only 2.5 million gross tons, as compared with a maximum world
output of 6.8 million tons in 1919 and 3.2 million tons in 1913.By
1928 a slight improvement in demand for new tonnage had 'appeared.
Over one-half of the shipping now on order, however, is to be equipped
with Diesel engines, indicating a replacement of obsolete with more
modern types; and over One-fifth of the total is tankers.The shipbuild-
ing industry of the world is still in a depressed state.
TABLE3.—STEAMAND MOTOR VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION
(Thousands of gross tons as of June'30)
Country 1914 1923 1928
Great Britain and Ireland 1,718 1,337 1,203
Germany 546 301 408
Netherlands 113 99 173
Italy 65 141 154















High operating expenses have furnished an urge to lower costs through
improved mechanical efficiency.The rapid increasein motor-ship
tonnage, from 234,000 tons in 1914 and 1,700,000 tons in 1923 to 5,153,000
tons in 1928, indicates how shipping executives have turned to the Diesel
engine as an aid in reducing operating expenses.Steamers fitted for
burning oil fuel have also greatly increased, from 1,300,000 tons in 1914
to 19,053,000 tons in 1928.The result has been that ships fitted for
burning only coal now comprise 61 per cent of the world's total, as
compared with 89 per cent in 1914.Recent tests with pulverized coal
may again cause the trend to change.The demand in recent years hasTRANSPORTATION 313
been for any type of prime mover which could be operated more cheaply
than the older types.
American Merchant Marine.—Against this background of depression
and low earnings, it is logical that American shipping has not prospered.
It will be seen, from Table 1 that American shipping has declined from
12.4 million tons in 1923 to 10.9 million tons in 1928, although world
tonnage has been increasing in this period.A large part of this reduction
has been due to scrapping, the Henry Ford project of breaking up 199
vessels of over half a million gross tons being the most ambitious, and
part to sales abroad.It should further be noted that of the vessels
registered under the American flag, 2,978,000 tons were idle on January
1, 1928.
One of the most important factors affecting our merchant marine in
the last five years is political and, consequently, intangible and highly
controversial.Fifty-eight per cent of the steam sea-going shipping of
this country in 1923 was owned by the Government.The Shipping
Board inherited about 2,000 ships planned for use in the war.Most
of these ships were not finished until long after hostilities had ended.
The wise course, as observers pointed out repeatedly in the years after
the war, would have been to sell these ships for use or for scrapping at any
price obtainable.From the political point of view, however, this pro-
posal was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to carry out.As a result,
the Shipping Board has been slow in disposing of its vessels, and has
tended to operate as many lines as Congress has been willing to support.
Some progreSs, however, has been made in reducing the amount of
Government-owned tonnage.Such tonnage comprised only 42 per cent
TABLE 4.—UNITED STATES SEA-GOING MERCBANT FLEET, 1,000GROSSTONS AND
OVER
(Thousandsof tons, as of January 1)
Government-owned
1923° 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928
6,544 6,318 6,109 5,507 4,563 4,337
Private 4,734 5,050 5,509 5,491 5,925 6,078
Total 11,278 11,368 11,168 10,998 10,488 10,415
° April1; figure for January 1 not available.
of our merchant fleet at the beginning of 1928, as contrasted with 58
per cent five years earlier.Of the decline in Government owned tonnage
amounting to 2,200,000 tons during this period, over three-quarters of a
million tons were scrapped.The rest of the Government tonnage dis-
posed of has found its way into active employment.The Shipping Board
has sold all of its lines in the Pacific to private owners, and success is
attending the efforts to dispose of the more important lines in the Atlicant314 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
trades.Even if the Board is successful in selling all of its lines, the prob-
lem of Government participation will not be entirely solved.Its large
laid-up fleet will still be a potential threat to the rate market.
Belief that the Shipping Board may retire from shipping operations
through sales to private owners has been strengthened by passage of
the White-Jones Shipping Act early in 1928.This legislation provides
for mail subventions on a fairly liberal scale and for Government
loans on liberal terms to American shipping companies building vessels
in American yards.The sale of Government lines operating to the West
Coast of Africa, on terms that were better than the Board had been pre-
viously able to obtain, was made possible by this legislation.Mail
subvention payments should also aid materially in the sale of the Shipping
Board's transatlantic lines.
The great activity of the Shipping Board in starting new cargo
services just after the war, coupled with the disorganization of foreign
shipping services, resulted in 71 per cent of all imports and 38 per cent
of all exports being carried in American vessels in 1921.These percent-
ages dropped to 47 and 25 per cent, respectively, in 1926, the latest
year for which these figures are available.A further analysis of the
figures shows that 30 per cent of imports of dry cargo from oversea desti-
nations was carried in American vessels in 1926 as compared with 44 per
cent in 1921, and of exports of dry cargo to oversea destinations 21 per
cent in 1926 was carried in American vessels as compared with 33 per cent
in 1921.Our ships have made a better showing in the case of oil cargo.
They brought in 76 per cent of our imports of petroleum in 1926 and
carried out 31 per cent of our exports.No clear dependence of our trade
on ships flying our flag is evident, since the volume of dry cargoes from
oversea rose from 12,357,000 tons in 1921 to 26,189,000 in 1926, and of
exports from 34,855,000 tons in 1921 to 46,914,000 tons in 1926.
At the present time, in only a few instances are Shipping Board lines
competing directly with privately owned lines.The Board has with-
drawn from the intercoastal trade, although it persists in selling ships
to owners who intend to upset co-operative efforts toward rate stability
in this The Shipping Board's lack of willingness to scrap useless
tonnage and its willingness to break out tied-up ships when rates rise,
as in the case of the British coal strike in 1926, act as a drag on shipping
rates.
It might be argued with some plausibility that a reserve of ships
available for use in case of a temporary shortage of shipping is a stabilizing
influence.No private enterprise could afford to have millions of dollars
invested in idle ships which would be used perhaps only for two or three
months every two or three years.In case of emergency these ships
would be put into a trade to keep rates at a level only slightly in advance
of what they were before the unusual circumstances arose.The incomeTRANSPORTATION 315
fromthe employment of these reserve ships during such an emergency
would not begin to pay the fixed charges on the investment while these
ships were idle.The Government has had idle ships and has used them
on occasions to provide extra facilities on routes temporarily crowded
with cargo.There is no sound economic argument for a continuance
of this situation, if private initiative and enterprise are to be the guiding
principles of our economic order.
Intercoastal Trade.—Wbile the Panama Canal was opened to traffic
in 1914, its effects on world trade did not begin to appear clearly until
two or three years after the war.The influence of the canal on American
shipping has been profound.The best of our privately owned merchant
fleet deserted foreign trade routes and entered the protected trade
between the Atlantic and Pacific coast.Foreign ships are forbidden
to engage in our coastwise trade and the intercoastal trade is interpreted
as being coastwise, although the trip is longer than most transoceanic
ones.In spite of keen competition among intercoastal shipping lines,
this business is more profitable than most foreign routes.
The heavy shipments of oil from California to the Gulf and Atlantic
Coast, which, for several years, gave employment to a large part of the
American tanker fleet, may not be permanent.On the other hand, it is
TABLE 5.—GaossTONNAGEOF UNITEDSTATESSTEAMERSINTHE INTERCOASTAL
TRADE,VIATHEPANAMA CANAL, TYPES,ASOFAPRIL 1
probable that an increasing n
and, perhaps, even additional
The significance of this
American vessels extends in several directions:
1. Our ships in this service are not handicapped by competition
with low-cost foreign ships and with seamen of lower standards
of living.If the business is not profitable, ship owners engaged
in it have only themselves to blame.
2. One argument for Government aid to our merchant marine
has been that ships under our flag are necessary in case of war.
Some of our finest ships are engaged in this protected trade.The
amount of tonnage in this trade, which should continue to increase,

































umber of cargo ships
passenger ships.
shift
will enter this service
in employment of privately owned316 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
3. Replacements and additions to the tonnage in the inter-
coastal trade will provide a backbone of work for our shipyards,
since only American-built vessels can engage in our coastwise
trade.
These points all relate directly to our merchant shipping industry.
The most far reaching influence, however, of this rapid growth of water
shipments between the Atlantic and Pacific coast has been on channels
of domestic trade and on the localization of industry in this country.
While the ten million tons of freight shipped by water through the
Panama Canal in a year is small in comparison with the billion and
one-third tons of revenue freight originating on all our railways, and
with the approximate quarter of a billion tons of transcontinental rail
traffic, its influence has been out of proportion to the size of the move-
ment.This is especially true when it is noted that 3,500,000 tons of
the intercoastal trade is oil, and, of the dry cargo probably a substantial
percentage was stimulated by the intercoastal services through the canal.
TABLE 6.—VoLuME OF WATER-BORNE TRADE BETWEEN ATLANTIC, GULF, AND
PAcIFIc COASTS VIA THE PANAMA CANAL

















Cargo has been diverted from the transcontinental rail lines at a
time when their earnings were low because of a variety of other reasons.
It cannot logically be argued that intercoastal shipments were a large
factor in the low earnings of these roads, but the diversion of traffic
from railways to ships was unquestionably one factor.
The more significant influence of this movement has been to retard
the localization of industries in certain sections of the Middle West.At
the present time, a shipper on a line running north and south approxi-
mately through Cleveland, Ohio, can send goods to the Pacific Coast as
cheaply by rail eastward and then by steamer westward through the
Panama Canal as by rail westward.Shippers east of this imaginary
line have lower transportation costs on west coast business, and new
industries are likely to take this factor into account when they are about
to locate a new plant.
The Middle West has thus been deprived of business which formerly
fell to its lot.The recent action of the Illinois Central Railroad in
publishing a joint rail and water tariff on steel articles originating around
Chicago and destined for the Pacific Coast via the Gulf is an effort toTRANSPORTATION 317
recapturesome of the freight which has been diverted to eastern mills
whose location enabled them to use intercoastal ship service.It is too
early as yet, however, to evaluate quantitatively the effect of this new
policy.
This shift in channels of traffic has brought up the question of regu-
lation of water rates in the intercoastal trade.The railroads which have
lost this traffic are rigidly regulated by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission.The ocean shipping companies in the intercoastal trade have
no restraints other than self-imposed ones.When intercoastal confer-
ence agreements have been broken and water rates lowered in the
resulting cut-throat competition, the "watershed" has moved westward
from Cleveland to the neighborhood of Chicago.Obviously, such
disarrangements are harmful to everyone concerned.If the shipping
executives in the intercoastal trade cannot stabilize their business
through co-operative action, Government regulation, in the interest of
the railroads and the shippers who suffer from quarrels among the
shipping companies, may result.The working out of this problem, for
which no exact precedent exists, will take time and even experimentation.
Inland growth of business interest in our inland
waterways, as a method of transportation supplementary to the agencies
already existing, is due partly to the action of the Council of National
Defense during the war.This Council recommended full utilization
of our inland waterway facilities, which they believed would be of material
benefit in the carriage of heavy traffic.The country was faced with
war-time congestion, withlittlelikelihoodofbetter conditions in
the near future; at the same time a constantly enlarging military program
pointed to heavier traffic movements.While the immediate object of
the Council's Committee on Inland Waterway Transportation was an
organization of waterway traffic to meet war-time emergency, consid-
eration was given to the future commercial value of various water routes,
the development of which was recommended.
The principle of joint rail and inland water rates was established
at this time.Without these joints tariffs and arrangements for inter-
change of cargo between rail and rivers, inland waterway carriers might
still be limited to cargo originating within a few miles of the waterway,
which was the situation prior to the appointment of the Committee on
Inland Waterway Transportation of the Council of National Defense.
Part of the renewed interest in inland waterways is due to Mr.
Hoover's insistance, while Secretary of Commerce, that our inland water
transportation activities should be directed toward a unified and inter-
changeable system of 9,000 miles in the Mississippi and tributary valleys,
and to a deep channel outlet from the Great Lakes to the Atlantic.
Also responsible for maintaining the interest of business men of the
Middle West in this large program is the shift in traffic arising from the318 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
opening of the Panama Canal.Those affected by this shift are seeking
cheaper transportation outlets and inlets, and therefore have been led
to give support to the •waterway services already in operation and to
Congressional action for the appropriations necessary to unify the whole
system.
In recent years, inland water transportation has increased steadily,
although, as Table 7 shows, it is still a small percentage of the total
volume of traffic carried by all means of transportation.
TABLE 7.—V0LUME OF TRAFFIC ON INLAND WATERWAYS
(In thousands of tons)
Item 1924 1925 1926
Tonnage originatingon railways 1.287,0001,351,0001,440,000
Overseae foreign commerce 82,118 81,808 100,274
Great Lakes trade, eliminating trade between the United
States and Canada 83,292 99,916 103,760
Trade between trnited States and Canada via Great Lakes.. .. 12,930 12,820 13, 195
United States coastwise ocean-borne commerce (excluding
Great Lakes and Panama Canal) 67,678 84,416 85,504
Total of navigable rivers and canals (excluding all known
duplication) 173,190 204,569 217,000
River transportation in the United States (excluding transit
tonnage of DetroitRiver) 102,432 118,294 127,421
Canal transportation in the UnitedStates 92,290 109,410 116,210
Sault Ste. Marie 72,037 81,875
9,460
85,679
Panama Canal (intercoastal traffic only) 11 ,327 10,922
Mississippi River inland waterway traffic has received more public
attention than that of our other rivers because, in there experimenting
with modern equipment, the Government is attempting to create con-
ditions required to stimulate private operation on these waterways.
TABLE 8.—TONS OF TRAFFIC CARRIED BY AND WARRIOR RIVERBARGE
LINES, 1918—1927











When the deepening of the Mississippi and its tributaries is completed
so that cargo can be continuously carried in large modern barges over the
greater part of 9,000 miles of inland channels, the effectiveness of thisTRANSPORTATION 319
method of transport—which is not new in our economic history—may
be more clearly apparent.
The Government has borne the expense of the experimental stages
of development, but if the inland waterways experiment by the Govern-
ment proves a success, private capital will probably enter this field of
transportation.A number of private corporations are now operating
their own river transport facilities.
In recent years the project of a deep channel waterway from the Great
Lakes to the Atlantic has been under consideration.The St. Lawrence
and the New York State routes have been surveyed from the engineering
and economic points.The conclusions of the United States St. Lawrence
Commission favored the construction of a shipway from the Great Lakes
to the sea for the relief and development of the interior of the continent.
They favored a shipway on the St. Lawrence route, provided suitable
agreement can be made with Canada for its joint undertaking.They
were of the opinion that the development of the power resources of the
St. Lawrence should be undertaken by associated agencies, and that
negotiations should be entered into with Canada in an endeavor to
arrive at an agreement on all of these subjects.Further conversations
between the Canadian Government and our own have taken place with-
out a definite line of united action having been decided upon.
Summary.—In the last five years, the world's shipping industry has
had to contend with the worst surplus of tonnage in its history, and the
decline in charter rates has been almost uninterrupted.
Not all ocean shipping has fared badly.The demand for faster and
more regular service has favored the cargo liner, and the picturesque
tramp is disappearing.
The adverse earning situation has reacted on the demand for new
ships.At the same time high operating expenses have furnished an
urge to lower costs through improved mechanical efficiency.Steamers
fitted for burning oil fuel have greatly increased, and over half the
shipping now on order is to be equipped with Diesel engines, indicating
a replacement of obsolete with more modern types.However, the
shipbuilding industry of the world is still depressed.American shipping
has not been prosperous.
The effect of the Panama Canal on American shipping has been
profound.The best of our privately owned merchant fleet is in the
protected trade between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.The canal has
also influenced our channels of domestic trade and the localization of
industry in this country.
The shifts in traffic due to the opening of the Panama Canal have
caused business men in the Middle West to back the development of the
Mississippi river system including a Great Lakes connection, and the
Great Lakes to the Atlantic waterway.